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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr 
ADvERSE POSSESSION 
PUBLIC ROAD. The plaintiff’s farm was divided by a road 
which was used by other property owners, the public schools and 
various members of the public for over 50 years. Although the 
road	was	not	officially	designated	as	a	county	 road,	 the	county	
maintained the road and included the road as a county road on 
all maps. The residents of the area considered the road a county 
road. In 1999, the county formally designated the road as a county 
road and the plaintiff brought a suit to quiet title to the road as the 
plaintiff’s property. The county claimed ownership of the road 
under adverse possession and the plaintiff argued that the public 
use of the road was permissive; therefore, title could not pass by 
adverse possession. The court noted that the presumption was in 
favor that the road use was permissive and required substantial 
evidence to overcome the presumption. The court held that the 
county had overcome the presumption in that (1) the road had been 
maintained and improved at the county’s expense for over 50 years, 
including grading, adding gravel, adding cattle guards and plowing 
snow (2) the plaintiff’s predecessor in interest treated the road as a 
county road, (3) other residents treated the road as a county road, 
(4) the county schools used the road for a bus route, and (5) the 
plaintiff observed the county’s and public use of the road without 
objection. Boykin v. Carbon County Bd. Of Commissioners, 
124 P.3d 677 (Wyo. 2006). 
BANkRUPTCy 
GENERAL

EXEMPTIONS

HOMESTEAD. The debtors, husband and wife, had transferred 
their residence to a self-settled living revocable trust with 
themselves	 as	 beneficiaries.	The	 debtors	 claimed	 the	 residence	 
as an exempt homestead in their Chapter 7 case and the trustee 
objected	to	the	exemption,	arguing	that	beneficiaries	of	a	trust	do	
not	have	sufficient	interest	in	a	residence	in	the	trust	to	support	a	
homestead exemption. The court examined Kansas law and held 
that the debtors’interests in the residence held in a self-settled living 
revocable	trust	were	sufficient	to	support	a	homestead	exemption	
for the debtor’s interests. In re kester, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 319 
(Bankr. 10th Cir. 2006), aff’g, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1776 (Bankr. 
D. kan. 2005). 
FILING FEES.	The	Deficit	Reduction	Act	of	2005	revised	the	 
bankruptcy	filing	fees,	effective	April	9,	2006:
 Chapter 7 - $245

     Chapter 11 - $1,000

 Chapter 12 - $200
Chapter 13 - $235 
Pub. L. No. 109-171, Sec. 10101, amending 28 U.S.C. § 
1930(a). 
FEDERAL TAX 
DISCHARGE. The	debtor	had	failed	to	timely	file	income	tax	
returns	and	pay	the	tax	for	several	years	but	eventually	filed	the	
returns for 1983 through 1990 in 1992. The IRS acknowledged 
receipt	of	all	but	the	1986	return.	The	debtor	filed	for	Chapter	7	
and received a discharge but the IRS argued that the 1986 taxes 
owed	 were	 not	 discharged	 because	 no	 return	 was	 filed.	The	
debtor presented evidence of a signed and dated copy of the 
1986 return which was also signed by the return preparer. The 
court held that the copy of the return and the fact that the return 
was	filed	with	several	other	returns	which	were	received	moved	 
the burden of proof to the IRS to show that it did not receive the 
return. Because the IRS failed to prove that the return was not 
filed,	the	court	held	that	the	1986	taxes	were	discharged.	The	IRS	
also	argued	that	the	filing	of	the	1986	return	six	years	after	it	was	
due	was	not	an	“honest	and	reasonable	attempt”	to	meet	the	filing	
requirements and should not be considered a return for purposes 
of Section 523(a)(B). The Bankruptcy and District Courts held 
that,	because	the	late	returns	were	filed	in	order	to	enable	the	
debtor to make offers in compromise, the returns served a valid 
good faith purpose and would be considered valid returns for 
purposes of the discharge of the taxes owed. The appellate court 
reversed,	holding	that	late-filed	returns	were	not	“returns”	for	
purpose	of	Section	523(a)(B)	because	the	debtor’s	filing	of	the	
returns	six	years	late	removed	the	purpose	of	filing,	to	spare	the	
IRS the burden of calculating the tax liability. In re Payne, 431 
F.3d 1055 (7th Cir. 2005), rev’g, 331 B,R, 358 (N.D. Ill. 2005), 
aff’g, 2004-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,210 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
2004). 
	 The	debtor	failed	to	file	returns	and	pay	taxes	for	11	years.	
During that period the taxpayer ran several businesses and had 
substantial income from the businesses. However, the debtor used 
some of the business accounts to pay personal expenses. The 
debtor	also	failed	to	file	returns	and	pay	taxes	for	the	businesses	
but those taxes were not in issue in this case. The taxpayer 
claimed that the failure to pay the taxes was due to the lack of 
funds to provide for more than the necessities of the debtor’s 
family. The court noted that the debtor had substantial income 
during the 11 years and was able to afford a luxury car, vacations 
and private education for the debtor’s children. The court held 
that the taxes for the 11 years were nondischargeable under 
Section 523(a)(1)(C) because the debtor willfully attempted to 
evade payment of the taxes. The court noted that the debtor was 
aware	of	the	obligation	to	file	returns	and	pay	taxes	from	previous	
years; the debtor was able to hide income and assets through 
the debtor’s businesses; the debtor failed to maintain accurate 
personal	and	business	records	which	made	it	difficult	accurately	 
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to determine the debtor’s personal and business income; the 
debtor	failed	to	file	returns;	and	the	debtor	had	sufficient	income	
at all times to make at least partial payment of the tax liability. 
In re Claxton, 335 B.R. 680 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006). 
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL 
PROGRAMS 
CHECk-OFF. The plaintiffs were importers of avocados 
subject to the Hass Avocado Promotion, Research and 
Information Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7801-7813, and the assessments 
made under theAct which were used to promote consumption of 
avocados. The plaintiffs argued that the assessments violated the 
plaintiffs’FirstAmendment right to be free of compelled speech. 
The suit was dismissed by the trial court because the plaintiffs 
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under Section 
7806. The appellate court held that “jurisdictional exhaustion,” 
which prohibited judicial review until all administrative 
remedies had been exhausted, required a clear and unambiguous 
statement in the statute that no judicial review was allowed until 
the administrative review process was exhausted. The appellate 
court held that the Act contained no such language; therefore, 
the plaintiffs were not prohibited from seeking judicial review 
before exhausting all available administrative reviews. However, 
because judicial review is discretionary where an administrative 
review is available, the appellate court remanded the case to the 
trial court for a decision as to whether the courts should exercise 
its discretion to perform judicial review prior to exhaustion of 
all administrative review. On remand, the trial court granted 
summary judgment to the defendants on the First Amendment 
claim because the Hass Avocado promotion program was 
sufficiently	similar	to	the	beef	promotion	program	in	Johanns 
v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005) which the 
Supreme Court held to be governmental speech not subject to 
First Amendment claims. Avocados Plus, Inc. v. veneman, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10144 (D. D.C. 2006), on rem. from,
370 F.3d 1243 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has issued proposed 
regulations amending the Common Crop Insurance Regulations, 
Walnut Crop Insurance Provisions and Almond Crop Insurance 
Provisions to reduce the insurable age requirements for almonds 
and walnuts because of the new varieties available. The changes 
will be applicable for the 2007 and succeeding crop years. 71 
Fed. Reg. 14119 (March 21, 2006). 
kARNALBUNT.	The	APHIS	has	adopted	as	final	regulations	 
which amend the Karnal bunt regulations regarding the 
requirements	that	must	be	met	in	order	for	a	field	or	area	to	be	
removed from the list of regulated areas. The changes allow a 
field	to	qualify	for	release	after	five	cumulative	years	of	specified	
management	practices,	rather	than	five	consecutive	years	as	the	
previous regulations provided, and reorganize the manner in 
which those management practices are described. 71 Fed. Reg. 
12991 (March 14, 2006). 
TUBERCULOSIS.	The	APHIS	has	adopted	as	final	regulations	
which amend the regulations concerning tuberculosis in cattle and 
bison by reducing, from 6 months to 60 days, the period following 
a whole herd test during which animals may be moved interstate 
from	a	modified	accredited	state	or	zone	or	from	an	accreditation	 
preparatory state or zone without an individual tuberculin test. 71 
Fed. Reg. 13926 (March 20, 2006). 
FEDERAL ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION 
vALUATION OF STOCk. The decedent’s estate included stock 
in a closely-held corporation. The stock was preferred stock subject 
to a redemption agreement at over $1,000 per share plus interest if 
the	redemption	occurred	after	specified	dates.	The	estate	valued	the	
stock at book value, $10 per share, but the stock was redeemed under 
the redemption agreement a year after the decedent’s death at $1,000 
plus interest. The Tax Court held that the redemption was relevant 
to the value of the stock at the decedent’s date of death because the 
redemption	was	foreseeable	and	the	corporation	had	sufficient	funds	
to make the redemption on the date of the decedent’s death. The 
Tax Court, however, allowed a 4 percent discount to the value of 
the stock as a “reasonable discount” for a potential purchaser. The 
appellate court remanded the case on this issue for the Tax Court 
to provide an explanation for the choice of a 4 percent valuation 
discount. On remand the Tax Court increased the discount to 12.5 
percent for risk that the company would not redeem the shares for 
the	full	price.		On	further	appeal,	the	appellate	court	affirmed	on	
the 12.5 percent discount issue. Estate of Trompeter v. Comm’r, 
2006-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,521 (9th Cir. 2006), aff’g on 
point, T.C. Memo. 2004-27, on rem. from, 279 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 
2002), rev’g and rem’g, T.C. Memo. 1998-35. 
FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 
ACTIvE DUTy DEDUCTIONS. The taxpayer retired from 
the U.S. Army in 1995 and was not on active duty in 2002, the tax 
year in question. However, in 2002 the taxpayer was employed by 
a	local	school	district	to	teach	a	Junior	Reserve	Officers’	Training	
Corps Program. The program was funded by the federal government. 
The taxpayer relied on IRS Publication 3 for the ability to claim 
subsistence, housing and uniforms costs as deductions. The court 
held that the taxpayer could not deduct the costs because the taxpayer 
was not on active duty in 2002. The court noted that taxpayers 
cannot rely on the IRS publications but must adhere to the statutes 
and regulations which allow such deductions only for active duty 
soldiers. Dorsey v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-50. 
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The taxpayers, husband and 
wife, owned a cattle ranch and obtained a grazing permit for 57 
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cattle on a portion of the Gila National Forest. The taxpayers 
sold the ranch, which caused the grazing permit to revert back 
to the federal government. The taxpayers claimed the reversion 
of the permit as a charitable deduction, based on the fair market 
value of the grazing permit. Under 36 C.F.R. § 222.3(b), a 
grazing permit requires that the permit holder own some private 
land and if the land or a portion of the land is sold, the grazing 
permit is waived in full or part. In addition, under United States 
v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973), a grazing permit conveyed no 
property interest in the grazed land. The court held that, because 
the grazing permit depended upon the taxpayers’ ownership of 
the ranch, the taxpayers did not have any ownership interest in 
the grazing permit which could be transferred by gift. Bischel 
v. United States, 2006-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,216 (D. 
Nev. 2006). 
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The taxpayer 
was employed by a governmental agency and was placed on 
administrative leave after publicity adverse to the agency was 
reported in the media, apparently based on interviews with 
the	 taxpayer.	The	 taxpayer	 filed	 a	 suit	 seeking	 damages	 for	
“emotional and mental anguish, humiliation and embarrassment, 
ridicule, physical pain and physical upset, damage to 
professional reputation, and damage to his reputation in the 
community.” The petition was not served on the employer 
because the employer agreed to a monetary settlement of the 
taxpayer’s claims. The settlement agreement stated that a portion 
of the settlement proceeds was compensation for damages under 
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) and was not included in taxable income. The 
court held that the settlement characterization of the taxpayer’s 
tax liability for the settlement proceeds was not controlling 
where the taxpayer failed to show that any physical injury was 
involved. Goode v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-48. 
DEPRECIATION. The IRS has issued tables detailing the (1) 
limitations on depreciation deductions for owners of passenger 
automobiles	first	placed	in	service	during	calendar	year	2006,	
including separate limitations on passenger automobiles 
designed to be propelled primarily by electricity and built by an 
original equipment manufacturer (electric automobiles); and (2) 
the amounts to be included in income by lessees of passenger 
automobiles	first	leased	during	calendar	year	2006,	including	
separate inclusion amounts for electric automobiles. 
For passenger automobiles (other than electric automobiles) 
placed in service in 2006 the depreciation limitations are as 
follows: 
Tax Year Amount 
1st tax year............................................$2,960

2d tax year ..............................................4,800

3d tax year ..............................................2,850

Each succeeding year .............................1,775

For trucks and vans placed in service in 2006 the depreciation 
limitations are as follows: 
Tax Year Amount 
1st tax year............................................$3,260

2d tax year ..............................................5,200

3d tax year ..............................................3,150

Each succeeding year .............................1,875
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For electric automobiles placed in service in 2006 the 
depreciation limitations are as follows: 
Tax Year Amount 
1st tax year............................................$8,980

2d tax year ............................................14,400

3d tax year ..............................................8,650

Each succeeding year .............................5,225
Rev. Proc. 2006-18, I.R.B. 2006-12, 645. 
DISASTER LOSSES. On January 27, 2006, the president 
determined that certain areas in Idaho are eligible for assistance 
from the government under the Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. § 5121) as a result of a severe storms 
and	flooding,	which	began	on	December	30,	2005.	FEMA-1630-
DR. Taxpayers who sustained losses attributable to the disaster 
may deduct the losses on their 2004 or 2005 returns. 
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer had 
a	small	 import	business	and	used	a	credit	card	to	finance	the	
purchases of the imported items. The taxpayer was unable to 
pay off the credit card and the credit card company hired a debt 
collection agency to collect the credit card balance of $21,831. 
The debt collection agency settled the matter with the taxpayer 
for $15,000 and agreed to waive the remaining $6,831. No 
written	settlement	agreement	was	executed	to	define	what	debts	
were forgiven or paid. The credit card company issued a Form 
1099-C for the $6,831 but the taxpayer claimed to have not 
received the form. The court held that the forgiveness of a debt 
alone determines the existence of discharge of indebtedness 
income and the failure to receive a Form 1099-C has no effect 
on the income tax liability for the discharge of indebtedness 
income. Martins v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2006-43. 
HOME OFFICE. The IRS has issued a revised fact sheet 
to include an explanation and examples of the phaseout of the 
credit for hybrid light trucks and passenger vehicles which 
begins with the second calendar quarter after the quarter in 
which a manufacturer records its 60,000th sale of a hybrid and/or 
advanced lean-burn technology motor vehicle. IRS Fact Sheet 
FS-2006-14 (Rev. March 16, 2006). 
IRA. The taxpayer had received distributions from an IRA
but failed to report the distributions as income. The taxpayer 
testified	 that	 most	 of	 the	 IRA	 funds	 were	 contributed	 from	 
after-tax funds in a savings account; however, the court did not 
believe the taxpayer’s testimony which was unsupported by any 
written evidence and was contradicted by some written evidence. 
The court held that the IRA distributions were taxable income 
because the taxpayer failed to show that the distributions were 
excludible under any exclusion provision. Hoang v. Comm’r, 
T.C. Memo. 2006-47 
LIMITED LIABILITy COMPANIES. The taxpayer was 
the single owner of a limited liability company (LLC) which did 
not make an election to be treated as a corporation for federal tax 
purposes. The LLC business incurred employment tax liability 
and the IRS sought to collect the taxes from the taxpayer. 
After the dispute was raised in court, the IRS issued proposed 
regulations which provided that persons who own LLCs which 
are disregarded entities for federal income tax purposes are not 
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treated as the employer for federal employment tax purposes. 
The court rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the proposed 
regulations be applied retroactively and held that, under the 
existing regulations, the taxpayer was personally liable for the 
LLC’s employment taxes. kandi v. United States, 2006-1 U.S. 
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,231 (W.D. Wash. 2006). 
PASSIvE ACTIvITy LOSSES. The taxpayer owned and 
managed	five	rental	properties	for	which	the	taxpayer	claimed	
$32,000 in loss deductions in a tax year. The taxpayer was also 
employed full time as a computer sales representative. The 
taxpayer argued that the taxpayer devoted enough time to the 
rental properties to qualify as a real estate professional. The 
taxpayer’s records had been seized as part of an investigation 
of the taxpayer’s employer and the taxpayer attempted to 
reconstruct the taxpayer’s rental activities records but was 
only able to estimate the time spent on the rental activities. The 
court	held	that	the	taxpayer’s	estimates	were	insufficient	proof	
of the time spent on the rental activities and denied the loss 
deduction in excess of $25,000. D’Avanzo v. United States, 
2006-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,229 (Fed. Cls. 2006). 
RETURNS. The IRS has issued a series of notices and 
revenue rulings warning taxpayers about frivolous arguments 
and schemes that taxpayers use to avoid their tax obligations. 
Notice 2006-31	 identifies	 civil	 and	 criminal	 penalties	 for	
participation in, or promotion of, abusive tax-avoidance 
schemes. Rev. Rul. 2006-17 emphasizes to taxpayers, promoters 
and return preparers that inserting the phrase “nunc pro tunc” 
on a return or other document submitted to the IRS has no 
legal effect and does not validate an invalid return, make a 
delinquent return timely, invalidate a signature, create a claim 
for refund of taxes previously paid, or reduce one’s federal tax 
liability. Rev. Rul. 2006-18 emphasizes to taxpayers, promoters 
and return preparers that any argument that Forms W-2 only 
record and report payments made to federal employees, or that 
only federal employees or residents of the District of Columbia 
or federal territories and enclaves earn wages subject to tax, has 
no merit and is frivolous. Rev. Rul. 2006-19 emphasizes that 
an individual cannot escape taxation by attributing income to 
a purported trust. Rev. Rul. 2006-20 emphasizes to taxpayers, 
promoters, and return preparers that there is no right to 
exemption from federal income tax for NativeAmericans under 
an	unspecified	“Native	American	Treaty.”	Any	return	position	
based	on	an	unspecified	“Native	American	Treaty”	has	no	merit	 
and is frivolous. Rev. Rul. 2006-21 emphasizes to taxpayers, 
promoters and return preparers that taxpayers are required to 
file	a	federal	income	tax	return	under	I.R.C.	§	6012		and	the	
regulations thereunder and that the Paperwork Reduction Act 
does	not	relieve	taxpayers	of	the	duty	to	file.	Notice 2006-31, 
Rev. Rul. 2006-17, Rev. Rul. 2006-18, Rev. Rul. 2006-19, 
Rev. Rul. 2006-20, Rev. Rul. 2006-21, I.R.B. 2006-15. 
The IRS has posted the following forms to its website, www.
irs.gov/formspubs/index.html, in the Forms & Pubs. section: 
Form 2210-F (2005), Underpayment of Estimated Tax by 
Farmers and Fishermen. 
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES 
April 2006
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term 
AFR 4.77 4.71 4.68 4.66 
110 percent AFR 5.25 5.18 5.15 5.12 
120 percent AFR 5.73 5.65 5.61 5.58 
Mid-term 
AFR 4.72 4.67 4.64 4.63 
110 percent AFR 5.21 5.14 5.11 5.09 
120 percent AFR 5.68 5.60 5.56 5.54 
Long-term
AFR 4.79 4.73 4.70 4.68 
110 percent AFR 5.27 5.20 5.17 5.14 
120 percent AFR 5.76 5.68 5.64 5.61 
Rev. Rul. 2006-22, I.R.B. 2006-14. 
STATUTORy EMPLOyEE. The taxpayer worked as a 
software	consult,	first	full	time	for	a	software	company	and	later	
for	a	temporary	employment	agency.	The	first	company	paid	an	
hourly salary, assigned the clients and provided travel expenses. 
The temporary employment agency also assigned clients, paid an 
hourly wage and provided travel expenses. The taxpayer claimed 
deductions on Schedule C for costs related to the employments 
but the court held that the taxpayer did not operate a business 
but was a common-law employee of both employers. Cole v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-44. 
THEFT LOSSES. The taxpayer guaranteed a loan obtained 
by a former business associate from a third party. The 
taxpayer claimed that the guarantee was made because of false 
representations by the business associate that the loan would 
be quickly repaid. After the taxpayer was required to pay the 
loan as guarantor, the taxpayer claimed the payment as a theft 
loss deduction, arguing that the taxpayer was induced to make 
the guarantee by the false representations of the associate. The 
court held that, under Indiana law, any theft would have been 
from the lender and not the taxpayer because the associate’s 
misrepresentation was used to obtain the loan, not the guarantee. 
Stolz v. United States, 2006-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,210 
(S.D. Ind. 2006). 
PROBATE 
PAyMENT OF CLAIMS. The decedent’s will bequeathed 
the farm real estate to the surviving spouse for life with the 
remainder to the decedent’s children. The surviving spouse 
received all the decedent’s personal property. The decedent’s will 
provided for payment of all debts from the estate, but did not 
provide for any order of use of property for the payment of the 
debts. Some of the real property was subject to a mortgage for 
which the decedent and spouse were jointly liable and for which 
the couple had granted a security interest in all farm personal 
property. Under Iowa Code § 633.436, all estate property is 
subject to payment of estate claims but generally the property 
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of the surviving spouse was to be used last, after other bequests. 
The children argued that the concepts of indemnity, suretyship 
and marshalling required the estate personal property to be used 
first	because	the	spouse	was	personally	liable	for	the	mortgage	
and the personal property was collateral for the mortgage. The 
court	held	that,	because	the	decedent’s	will	did	not	specifically	
provide	for	specific	property	to	be	used	to	pay	estate	claims,	Iowa	
Code § 633.436 controlled to abate bequests for the payment 
of estate claims. Therefore, the mortgage was to be paid from 
property passing to the heirs before reaching the personal property 
specifically	bequeathed	to	the	surviving	spouse.	 In the Matter 
of the Estate of Donald F. Riebhoff, 2006 Iowa App. LEXIS 
225 (Iowa Ct. App. 2006). 
PRODUCT LIABILITy 
GRINDER/MIXER. The plaintiff purchased a used grinder/
mixer from the defendant. Both parties knew that the grinder/mixer 
was missing a guard on the auger and the defendant had agreed 
to replace the guard; however, the grinder/mixer was delivered 
without the auger guard, although a guard on the power take 
off had been replaced. The plaintiff was injured while using the 
grinder/mixer after slipping on ice near the grinder/mixer when 
the plaintiff’s hand fell into the auger. The jury found that both 
parties were negligent. The defendant argued that the plaintiff’s use 
of the grinder/mixer without the auger guard was the superseding 
cause of the accident, relieving the defendant of any liability. The 
court rejected the defendant’s argument, stating that the doctrine 
of contributory negligence provided the method of determining 
the extent of negligence for both parties. The court noted that the 
defendant’s negligence for failure to deliver the grinder/mixer 
with a guard on the auger was not so removed from the accident 
as to violate public policy to hold the defendant at least partial 
liable for the injury. The case is designated as Not for Publication. 
Buchholz v. Farmers Inc. Of Allentown, 2006 Wisc. App. 
LEXIS 206 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). 
TRACTOR. The plaintiff suffered injuries while using a tractor 
manufactured	by	the	defendant	to	move	dirt	in	a	field.	The	tractor	
rolled over after becoming stuck in a hole. After the accident, the 
plaintiff repaired the tractor and purchased another tractor which 
would allow the plaintiff to operate the tractor even with the 
injuries suffered in the accident. The plaintiff also continued the 
dirt	moving	and	altered	the	scene	of	the	accident.	The	plaintiff	filed	 
suit for negligence for failure to provide a roll over protection 
system on the tractor. The defendant argued that the case should 
be dismissed because the plaintiff spoilated evidence by making 
the repairs to the tractor and altering the scene of the accident 
by moving the dirt. The trial court had dismissed the action 
because of the change and loss of evidence. The appellate court 
reversed, holding that a dismissal for spoilated evidence required 
a	finding	that	the	plaintiff	spoilated	the	evidence	in	bad	faith	so	as	
to prejudice the defendant’s ability to render a full defense. The 
court noted that the plaintiff’s actions may have prejudiced the 
plaintiff’s case more than the defense. Menz v. New Holland 
North America, Inc., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 6385 (8th Cir. 
2006). 
SECURED TRANSACTIONS 
PERFECTION. The plaintiff loaned money to a farmer for the 
purchase of a tractor. The farmer granted a security interest in the 
tractor	as	collateral	and	the	plaintiff	filed	a	financing	statement.	
The	financing	statement	misspelled	the	farmer’s	name	as	Roger	
instead of the accurate Rodger. The farmer also borrowed money 
from the defendant bank which also obtained a security interest 
in the farmer’s equipment, including the tractor. The bank’s 
financing	statement	included	the	accurate	spelling	of	the	farmer’s	
first	name.		When	the	farmer	filed	for	bankruptcy,	the	lenders	
both claimed a security interest in the tractor. The bank argued 
that the plaintiff’s security interest was unperfected because the 
financing	 statement	was	 seriously	misleading	 since	 it	did	not	
contain the debtor’s accurate name. The court held that, because 
a	standard	search	of	the	debtor’s	correct	name	would	not	find	the	 
plaintiff’s security interest in the state’s database, the plaintiff’s 
security interest was unperfected. The court noted that this placed 
the burden on the creditor to list the correct debtor’s name on the 
financing	statement	and	did	not	require	that	a	searching	creditor	
use variants of the debtor’s name in any security interest search. 
Pankratz Implement Co. v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 2006 kan. 
LEXIS 141 (kan. 2006), aff’g, 102 P.3d 1165 (kan. Ct. App. 
2004). 
